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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case No. 
- vs. -
C. W. BRADY, JR., 
10653 
Defendent-Appellan t. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, C. W. "Buck" Brady, Jr., appeals 
from his conviction of first degree perjury in viola-
tion of Section 76-45-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
upon jury trial in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County. The Honorable John F. Wahlquist, judge, 
sitting at request. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was indicted for the crime of first 
degree perjury by a grand jury convened during 
1965 in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Appellant 
made several pretrial motions to quash the indict-
2 
ment, which were denied by the trial court. The ap-
pellant stood mute at the time of arraignment, an:l 
a plea of not guilty was entered. A motion to sup-
press certain evidence given before the HonorablG 
Maurice D. Jones, Judge of the City Court of Salt 
Lake City, was filed and denied. Upon jury trial, th,: 
appellant was found guilty and judgment was sub-
sequently pronounced. A motion for new trial was 
filed and denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the conviction should 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following state-
ment of facts as being more in keeping with ruie 
that the evidence on cippeal will be viewed in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict. 
The indictment in the instant case charged the 
appellant with the commission of perjury in the first 
degree on May 7, 1965, by falsely testifying before 
Honorable Maurice D. Jones, a magistrate and city 
judge of the City Court of Salt Lake City (R. 1 ). The 
indictment returned by the Salt Lake County Grand 
Jury against the appellant sets out various partic-
ulars in which it is claimed that the appellant per-
jured himself. 
The first allegation material to this appeal, in 
view of the trial court's instructions, is captioned "A" 
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ii1 the Schedule A of the Appendices to the appel-
lant's brief and qoes to the question as to whether, 
subsequent to the time the appellant returned to 
Salt Lake after a trip to Indiana to view a "bitpaver," 
the county was testing a bitpaver and whether 
there were reports submitted to the appel-
lant as to the results of any test. The appellant re-
sponded to each of the questions posed on the sub-
ject in testifying before Judge Jones and said in ef-
foct that the county was testing the bitpaver and 
that Mr. N er din had contacted him "quite frequent-
ly and went out to the scene quite frequently to 
see the tests." 
The second area of the indictment where the 
State contended the appellant had committed per-
jury is that identified in the appellant's brief by the 
letter "B'' in Schedule A of the Appendices. This 
testimony given before Judge Jones by the appel-
lant was to the effect that the bitpaver machine was 
used in the Chesterfield area right up until Christ-
mastime. Also encompassed in the appellant's 
testimony at this time was a statement that he did 
not know that the bitpaver had not been used in 
January through February, 1964, nor did he remem-
ber discussing the fact with a member of the In-
diana Toll Road Commission that they would not 
use their bitpaver subsequent to Labor Day and 
until the following May. 
The third area of the indictment, referenced as 
letter "C" in Schedule A of the Appendices of ap-
pellant's brief and in relation to the portion of the 
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indictment that the court instructed on in Instruc-
tion No. 6, was testimony by the appellant that the 
bitpaver machine was used up until December, 1963 
when weather moved in, and that the machine had 
been left in Chesterfield; and, subsequently, the 
mo.chine was taken from Chesterfield back to the 
county road shops sometime in January. 
The fourth portion of the appellant's testimony 
which the court instructed on as being false in In-
struction No. 6 is that portion set out in referenced 
letter "D" of Schedule A of the Appendices of the 
appellant's brief as to the type of equipment that 
the appellant had leased in the past for the county. 
The appellant replied that a garbage packer and 
some sweepers had been leased. 
The four areas indicated above were those 
areas which the trial court instructed the jury in re-
lationship to the evidence and, consequently, those 
areas upon which the facts must be viewed in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine if 
that evidence is sufficient as a matter 0£ record to 
support the jury's conclusion. 
Judqe Maurice D. Jones of the City Court ot 
Salt Lake City was called as a witness (R. 108). He 
testified that plaintiff's Exhibit 1, which is a John 
Doe complaint, charged the suspect with accessory 
to the crime of attempting to bribe an executive of-
ficer, and was prepared by the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's office. He issued the complaint on April 
22, 1965 (R. 108). He stated that the complaint was 
never given a file number and that the carbon and 
5 
original of the complaint were apparently left with 
the Salt Lake County Attorney after the hearing and 
at the time a sscond complaint was issued against 
appellant (R. 109, 110, 112). Up until that time, Judge 
Jones kept the John Doe complaint in his possession. 
Subsequent to the issucince of the complaint, the a_p-
pellant, C. W. "Buck" Brady, appeared before Judg::: 
Jones, when the complaint VvJ.s in his possession. 
He appeared with CO"!.,msel a.nd was sworn by Judo,e 
Jones 0nd. thereafter, testified. Judge Jones interro-
qated the appellant on a question end answer basis 
c::mcerning certain activities of the appellant as 
Chairman of the S3lt Lake County Commission and 
head of the Div~sion of Roads and Bridges and, 
rn.ore specifically, with reference to the lease by the 
co'-lnty of a bitpaver (Tr. 114). (plaintiffs Exhibit 2) 
Mr. Ned Greenig testiiied that on May 7, 1965. 
he was the court reporter who took the testimony 
of the appellant during the interrogation conducted 
by Judge Jones (Tr. 116). Exhibit 2 was admitted into 
evidence and rea.d to the jury and formed the basis 
of the alleged fab::: tsstimony for which the app2l-
lant was charged with perjury. The appellant testi-
fied before Judge Jones in accordance with the ol.lt-
lined categories noted above and indicated, with 
some particularity, that the bit;.:iaver machine leassd 
from Midvale Motors, Inc., was used in the Chester-
field area, Salt Lake County, up until approximately 
Christmastime (plaintiff's Exhibit 2). 
Mr. Hubert H. Nielsen testified that he was th2 
owner of a Temco Bitpaver comparable to that 
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identified in plaintiffs Exhibit 3. He did business as 
Bonneville Equipment Incorporated. During th'? 
early part of the year 1963, he ha.cl for sale a bit-
. d . h' l . h' hi paver engme an pump engme, w 1cn is a~ ig ,y 
capable piece of road rr~aintenance and construc-
tion mJchinery that mechanically lays down asphalt 
and road mat (Tr. 161). The bitpaver had been used 
approximately 120 hours and was a used machine 
(Tr. 161). Mr. Nielsen attempted to negotiate for the 
sale of the bitpaver with Salt Lake County and con-
tacted Mr. Boyd Nerdin, Superintendent of the Sol\ 
Lake County Roads and Bridges (Tr. 161). This \Vus 
in, approximately, May of 1963 (Tr. 161). Initial nego-
tiations were conducted and a second conversrl-
tion was had behNeen Nielsen and Nerdin at Nie~­
sen's home. Nerdin indicated that possibly the ap 
pellant, Mr. Brady, might be interested in the m~­
chine for the county (Tr. 164). Mr. Nielsen wa.s ad-
vised by Mr. Nerdin to contact Mr. Ted Newsor,1 
as an individual close to Mr. Brady (Tr. 165). The 
testimony with reference to the advice was not of-
fered as to the truth of what was said, but merely 
to sho·.v the action taken by Mr. Nielsen after thn 
advice. 
lAr. l'Helsen had two mE:etings with Mr. Newsom 
at vvhi:::h the bitpaver V·Tas discussed (Tr. 166-167). 
and recEived an indication that the appellant, Mr 
Brady, would like to see the machine in operation. 
Arrangements were made bv Mr. Nielsen to take the 
a:opella_nt back to the Indiana Toll Road outside of 
G':LrV, Indiana, to observe a bitpaver in operation. 
Mr. Nielsen ma.de arrangements to take the uppe1-
7 
lant to Indiana and Mr. Newsom accompanied them 
(Tr. 168). While back there, Mr. Nielsen, Mr. New-
som and the appellant observed the bitpaver in 
operation and were advised by a Mr. Shemahorn 
and a Mr. Ma.llott, employees of the Indiana Toll 
Road, that they "put their machine to bed" at "Labor 
Day, regardless of weather." (Tr. 169). Mr. Nielsen 
testified that he discussed the possible purchase oi 
the bitpaver by the county with the appellant in a 
motel in Indiana and on the plane returning to Salt 
Lake City (Tr. 170). He told the appellant that he was 
interested in selling the machine and mentioned 
the price of $29,000.00 (Tr. 171). The appellant indi-
cated that he was impressed with the performance 
of the machine, but had some budgetary problems 
(Tr. 171). Mr. Nielsen also indicated that he sug-
gested to the appellant that the county lease the 
machine for a month or two to see how it worked 
(Tr. 171). 
Subsequent to returning to Salt Lake City, after 
viewing the operation of the bitpaver in Indiana, 
Mr. Nielsen had conversations with Mr. Newsom 
in an effort to obtain the sale of the machinery to 
the county (Tr. 172). He had a conversation with Mr. 
Newsom on the 7th or 8th day of August, 1963, in 
which Newsom indicated that the appellant was 
very definitely interested in the machine, bd 
that he still had budgetary problems (Tr. 173). New-
som then advised Nielsen that if he wanted to get 
the machine out of his hair that he ought "to sharpen 
his pencil and get down to the lowest possible 
price." Newsom indicated that Midvale Motors, Inc. 
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was willing to purchase the machine (Tr. 173). It 
was indicated further that the county and the appel-
lant desired to have some test of the performance 
capabilities of Mr. Nielsen's bitpaver. Arrangements 
were made to test the bitpaver in West Jordan, Salt 
Lake County, and attempt to set up some other test 
area in which to run patterns as to the machine's 
performance (Tr. 17 4). A test pattern was run in the 
West Jordan area. Mr. Newsom advised Mr. Nielsen 
that he was president and major owner of Midvale 
Motors, Inc. (Tr. 175). This statement by Mr. New-
som was apparently untrue, as Mr. John K. Russell 
testified that he was the accountant for Motor Lease, 
Inc. and that Mr. Neuman C. Petty was the presi-
dent and majority stockholder of Midvale Motors, 
Inc., and that to his knowledge, Mr. Ted Newsom 
had no position with Midvale Motors, Inc. A sale 
of the equipment was made by Mr. Nielsen to Mid-
vale Motors, Inc., on August 22, 1963, for the sum 
of $18,700.00. Mr. Nielsen was paid a cashier's check 
signed by Ted M. Newsom as president of Midvale 
Motors, Inc. (Tr. 176). Mr. Nielsen, prior to the sale 
of the bitpaver to Midvale Motors, Inc., had sub-
mitted an offer to Mr. Newsom clo Motor Lease, Inc., 
indicating a purchase price of $29,950.00 (Tr. 178). 
(defendant's Exhibit 5). This is approximately the 
same price for which the machine had been offered 
to Salt Lake County. 
Subsequent to the purchase of the machine by , 
Midvale Motors, Inc., a lease was negotiated be-
tween Midvale Motors, Inc., and the Board of Coun-
ty Commissioners of Salt Lake County (Exhibit 4-P). 
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The lease was for five consecutive months, com-
mencing on the 23rd of August, 1963, and ending 
on the 22nd day of February, 1964, and provided 
for a $4,000.00 per month rental. The lease also pro-
vided that all payments were to be made prior to 
December 31, 1963, but that the lease was cancE::l-
able. At the time of the lease, Commissioners 
Cannon and Jensen were present, and the lease 
was approved (Tr. 184). The record reflected that 
on December 23, 1963, the appellant sent a letter 
to the Salt Lake County Auditor, requesting pay-
ment of $4,000.00 on the lease rental. All previous 
payments had been made. 
Mr. John Van Ausdal, an employee of Salt Lake 
County Roads and Bridges Division, testified tha.t 
he had been operating the bitpaver ever since 1959, 
and prior to his employment with Salt Lake County, 
was employed by Bonneville Equipment Co. (Tr. 
209). Mr. Van Ausdal started to work for the county 
using the bitpaver before the first lease with the 
county was consummated. He also testified that he 
laid down test patterns for the county prior to the 
sale of the bitpaver (Tr. 210). He indicated that the 
bitpaver had not been used subsequent to Thanks-
giving day, 1963 because of brake damage (Tr. 211), 
and that its use immediately prior to breakdown was 
in the Chesterfield area of Salt Lake County (Tr. 211). 
He testified that after the bitpaver was shut down in 
November of 1963, it was not again used by the 
county until April or May of 1964. He further said 
the bitpaver was taken to the county shops at the 
same time the use was discontinued (Tr. 211, 212). 
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Mr. Stanley Thayne testified that he was th2 
"seal coat foreman" for the Salt Lake County Roads 
and Bridges Division and that the bitpaver was used 
for the last time in the year 1963 around the 15th 
or 20th of November. He further testified that th0 
machine was brought into the Salt Lake County 
Road Shops before Thanksgiving, and was not sub-
sequently used until May of 1966 (Tr. 221, 222). 
Mr. Joe Riccardi, office clerk of the Salt Lab? 
County Roads and Bridges Division, indicated that 
employees kept daily time sheets and that a daily 
report on the "chips" spread by the bitpaver was 
kept by him (Tr. 235). The report was prepared by 
Mr. Riccardi from information and documents sup-
plied by employees of the Salt Lake County Roads 
and Bridges Division, and entries were made in the 
report periodically. Exhibit 21 was the report for 
the period of the lease between Midvale Motors, 
Inc., and Salt Lake County, entered into in Augus1 
of 1963. It showed that there were no chips spread 
after November 15, and that the work done by the 
spreader at that time had been in the Chesterfield 
area of Salt Lake County. In addition, reports from 
the Salt Lake County Roads and Bridges Division 
showed that the bitpaver received little or no gasr1-
line and oil servicing subsequent to November of 
1963 (plaintiff's Exhibit 20). Records in the county 
road shops disclose that there were no asphalt oils 
purchased by Salt Lake County from its two distribi.i-
tors for use with the bitpaver after November 4, 1963 
(plaintiff's Exhibits 16 and 17). Testimony was also 
received thci_t the bitpaver could not operate in wet 
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weather, and Exhibit 23 received by the court on 
stipulation, showed the local climatologicel data. Ior 
Salt Lake County in the months of November and 
December, which indicated substantial precipitaticn 
from the 15th of November on in 1963. On the 15th 
of November, Salt Lake Valley received 5.8 inches 
of snow (p. 1 Exhibit 23). 
The payments on the lease of August 23, 1963, 
had been paid by check of $8,000.00 on September 
26, $4,000.00 on October 25, $4,000.00 on December 
23, and $4,000.00 on January 10. (plaintiff's Exhibit 
31). The appellant, on December 2, 1963, requested 
approval of the payment of $4,000.00 to Midvale 
Motors, Inc., for the rental of the bitpaver by the 
Salt Lake County Department of Roads and Bridges 
during the month of November. On December 23, 
1963, a letter was sent by the appellant to the SaH 
Lake County Board of County Commissioners re-
questing payment of $4,000.00 to Midvale Motors, 
Inc., for the rental of the bitpaver during the mont:-i 
of December. 
Mr. Thomas McKean, a sales engineer for Cate's 
Equipment Co., testified that an Alles-Chalmer's trac-
tor was sold to Motor Lease, Inc. of Salt Lake County 
for $43,851.00. Exhibits 15, 18, and 19, which wer2 
received by the court, disclose that Motor Lease, 
Inc., had proposed in May of 1963 to lease the trac-
tor to Salt Lake County for a 48-month period at 
$1,994.00 per month. Commissioner Marvin G. Je:::-c-
sen testified that the agreement was neve:::- com-
pleted, because he questioned the appellant on 
12 
whether the lease rental was excessive (Tr. 267). 
Commissioner Jensen testified that he told the ap-
pellant that the proposed lease contract with Motor 
Lease, Inc., would be in excess of $80,000.00 and 
not in the best interest of the county, since the same 
piece of equipment could be purchased for $53,-
000.00 (Tr. 268-269). Commissioner Jensen testified 
that the lease with Motor Lease, Inc., to lease the 
tractor for one month (plaintiff's Exhibit 18) was 
entered into because the county had already been 
using the equipment. Subsequently, a lease from 
June 15, 1963, to June 14, 1965, was entered into by 
Salt Lake County Roads and Bridges and Motor 
Lease, Inc., whereby Motor Lease, Inc., leased to 
the county the same tractor referred to above. The 
lease was signed by Ted Newsom as manager for 
Motor Lease, Inc., and ran from the 15th day of 
June, 1963, to the 14th day of June, 1965, or a period 
of 24 months. The lease was for $3,000.00 the first 
six months and $1,080.00 per month for the remain-
ing 18 months (plaintiff's Exhibit 19). Commissioner 
Jensen testified that proposed leases on equipment 
would come through the Salt Lake County Roads 
and Bridges Department, which was hea.ded by the 
appellant. The two leases with Motor Lease, Inc., 
for the tractor did not go through the commission 
because of Commissioner Jensen's apparent un-
familiarity with the procedure. 
Subsequent to the expiration of the lease be 
tween Midvale Motors, Inc., and Salt Lake County 
Roads and Bridges, on the 15th day of June, 1964, 
the appellant, acting for the Board of County Com-
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m1ss10ners of Salt Lake, executed a second lease 
with Midvale Motors, Inc., for the lease of the bH-
paver from the 1st day of June, 1964, to the 30th d3-y 
of November, 1964, for $4,000.00 at the time of execu-
tion and five equal payments of $4,000.00 (Tr. l 9G). 
Based upon the above evidence, the jury re-
turned a verdict finding the appellant guilty of per-
jury in the first degree. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY FINDING THE APPEL-
LANT GUILTY OF FIRST DEGREE PERJURY. 
The appellant contends that the evidence of-
fered at trial was insufficient to sustain his convic-
tion. The respondent submits that the evidence pre-
sented amply supports the conviction, when thG 
case is reviewed in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. In State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 
P.2d 865 (1959), this court observed as to the proper 
manner of viewing a contention that evidence of-
fered at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury's 
verdict: 
"The rules governing the scope of review on ap-
peal as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 
the verdict are well settled: that it is the prerogative 
of the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses 
and to determine the facts; that the evidence will be 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict; 
and that if when so viewed it appears that the jury 
14 
acting fairly and reasonably could find the defendent 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not 
be disturbed." 
Section 76-45-1(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
defines perjury as follows: 
"A person is guilty of perjury who 
(1) Swears or affirms that he will truly testify, 
declare, depose or certify, or that any testimony, de-
claration, deposition, certificate, affidavit or other 
writing by him subscribed is true, in, or in connection 
with, any action or special proceeding, hearing or in-
quiry, or on any occasion in which an oath is required 
by law or is necessary for the prosecution or defense 
of a private right or for the ends of public justice or 
may lawfully be administered, and who in such action 
or proceeding or on such hearing, inquiry or other 
occasion wilfully and knowingly testifies, declares, 
deposes or certifies falsely or states in his testimony, 
declaration, deposition, affidavit or certificate any 
matter to be true which he knows to be false." 
Section 76-45-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
defines perjury in the first degree as follows: 
"A person is guilty of perjury in the first de-
gree who commits perjury as to any material matter 
in or in connection with any action or special pro-
ceeding, civil or criminal, or any hearing or inquiry 
involving the ends of public justice or on an occasion 
in which an oath or affirmation is required or may 
lawfully be administered." 
Consequently, before this court may overturn 
the appellant's conviction of perjury in the first de-
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gree, it must find from viewing the evidence in a 
light most favorably against the appellant that no 
reasonable jury or judge could have concluded 
that the evidence presented demonstrated a viola-
tion of the above cited statutes. 
Further, although the trial court instructed on 
four general areas of appellant's testimony before 
Judge Jones, if the evidence is sufficient to show 
perjury in reference to any particular of the testi-
mony given, the fact that with reference to other 
matters concerning which appellant testified, th(~ 
evidence was not sufficient, will not preclude cor:.-
viction and affirr'lance by this court. 
In State v. Anderson, 35 Utah 496, 101 Pac. 385 
(l 909), this court observed: 
"The information contains several assignments 
of perjury not here enumerated, which contain state-
ments alleged to have been made by defendant in 
the same case, and at the same time, and of the same 
general character as the foregoing; but the court, in 
its instructions to the jury, withdrew all except those 
we have enumerated from their consideration. It will 
be observed that the several assignments contained 
in the information consist of certain alleged succes-
sive statements made by defendant while testifying 
as a witness, and are so related to the one question 
which was the subject-matter of inquiry in the action 
in which the testimony was given, and were so linked 
and blended together in the point of time, as to con-
stitute but one act or transaction, and therefore con-
stitute but one offense. And, furthermore, the author-
ities seem to uniformly hold that all matters to which 
the defendant swore falsely may be embraced in one 
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count (2 Wharton's Crim. Law, sections 1299, 1301; 
Wharton's Crim. Proc. and Pr., 251; Commonwealth 
v. Jones, 6 Gray [Mass.] 275; Commonwealth v. Mc-
Laughlin, 122 Mass. 449; Adellberger v. State [Tex. 
Cr. App.], 39 S.W. 103; De Bernie v. State, 10 Ala. 
23; Railroad v. Callahan, 6 B. and C. 109). And 
proof of the falsity of any one of them will support a 
general verdict of guilty (such as was rendered in 
this case), although the other assignments in the in-
formation are not sustained by the evidence. ( 2 
Wharton's Crim. Law [9 Ed.], section 1301; Whar-
ton's Crim. Ev. [9 Ed.], 131; 16 Ency. Pl. and Pr., 
350.) 
We find no error in the record. The judgment is 
affirmed." (Emphasis added) 
This position is very much in accord with over-
whelming majority of cases and authorities. 41 Am. 
Jur., Perjury, sec. 47; 1 Wharton's Criminal Evi-
dence, 10th Ed., sec. 131; 2 Wharton's Criminal Law, 
12th Ed., sec. 1567; State v. Taylor. 202 Mo. 1, 100 
S.W. 41; Arena v. United States. 226 F.2d 227 (9th 
Cir. 1955); United States v. Crummer. 151 F.2d 958 
(10th Cir. 1945). 
Consequently, if the evidence is sufficient on 
any particular of the indictment, the conviction must 
be affirmed. 
In addition, the State submits that the conten-
tion of appellant set forth on page 4 of appellant's 
brief that proof of the perjury must be shown by 
direct and positive testimony of two witnesses or 
one witness and corroborating evidence is not 
necessarily the rule applicable in Utah. The Com-
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piled Laws of Utah 1907 § 4748; Compiled Laws of 
Utah 1917 § 8848; Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 § 
105-21-21 provided in part: 
"Perjury must be proved by the testimony of 
two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating cir-
cumstances.'' 
See State v. Gleason. 86 Utah 26, 40 P.2d 222 (1935). 
This provision, however, was subsequently re-
pealed in 1935 with the adoption of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, Laws of Utah 1935, Ch. 118, § 1. 
Consequently, there is an express legislative repeal 
of the two witness rule etc., and it must be con-
cluded that the present rule is simply whether, tak-
ing the evidence as a whole, reasonable men could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of 
an accused. The abandonment of the more rigid 
rules of proof is noted in 41 Am. Jur., Perjury. § 67, 
where it is observed: 
"Although it seems once to have been the rule 
that to support a conviction of perjury the evidence 
of two witnesses was required to establish the falsity 
of the oath on which the indictment was based, it is 
now well settled that such a conviction may be had on 
the evidence of one witness supported by proof or 
corroborating circumstances, or by the testimony of 
two witnesses, or, where it is so provided by statute, 
by the accused's own confession in open court." 
See also 88 A.L.R.2d 852, 864. 
Taking even the standard urged by appellant 
instead of a general standard normally applicable 
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in criminal cases, it is clear that the evidence in this 
case is amply sufficient to sustain the conviction. 
A. Testing the Bitpaver. 
The respondent agrees that the evidence pr'?-
sented at the time of trial was not sufficient to 
sustain a conviction based on alleged fa_lsity of ap-
pellant's statements with reference to the testing of 
the bitpaver. The prosecution, at the time of argu-
ment, acknowledged to the jury the fact that the 
State did not rely on that portion of the indictment 
to support a conviction. 
B. The Use of the Bitpaver Up to Christmas-
time. 
It is submitted that the evidence on this issue 
is ample to sustain the appellant's conviction no mat-
ter what rule is applied. The appellant's testimony 
before Judge Jones was to the effect that the bit-
paver was used "right up until Christmas." He ex-
pressly told Judge Jones: "We used this machine 
up until December, I'm sure, right until Christmas-
time." (Exhibit P-2). Thus .. appellant's testimony be-
fore Judge Jones, when viewed in a light most fav-
orable to the conviction, shows a definite and posi-
tive assertion by the appellant that the bitpaver 
machine was being used right up until Christmas 
of 1963. The machine was being leased by appel-
lant's department for $4,000.00 per month, and ths-
failure to use the machine during the period of the 
le:Ise, where the lease was cancelable by the coun-
ty at any time, would strongly evidence that Mr. 
Brady was not looking out for the best interests of 
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the citizenry in administering his department. Fu:::-
ther, the lease price, itself, when appra.ised against 
the recent sales price of the machine immediately 
before the county leased it, makes the lease rela-
tionship suspect. Therefore, any inquiry relating to 
the actual use of the machine would be directly 
material to any inquiry concerning Commissioner 
Brady's administration of the County Roads and 
Bridges Division. Further, when Exhibit P-2 showed 
that the appellant acknowledged that Ted Newsom, 
who had purchased the machine and was con-
nected with the lessor, had put up money ($2,000.00) 
for the purchase of property in Park City in which 
the appellant was to have an interest and the ap-
pellant had, as yet, paid nothing, for the use of th9 
property (Exhibit P-2, pp. 26, 27, 28). The testimony, 
therefore, related to whether the payments made 
for the machine were actually needed or a means 
whereby county money was placed in the hands of 
the appellant's friends, who in turn returned it to 
the appellant in order to continue to do business 
vrith the county. 
The jury was legitimately within its province 
if it found that the appellant, by his testimony be-
fore Judge Jones, was deliberately and knowingly 
trying to communicate the contention that the bit-
paver had been used as much as possible and had 
not set idle for a long period while rental was paid 
on it. The appellant's testimony was a direct asser-
tion that the machine had been used up until 
Christmas. He interjected this assertion to rebut the 
contention implicit in Judge Jones' question that 
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normal use of the machine would dictate putting 
it up on Labor Day and the appellant knew this, 
and thus, the lease was a coverup. The appellant 
had requested payment for the use of the machine 
under the lease during the month of December. If 
the machine had remained idle during this period, 
the appellant's motives would necessarily be 
suspect. Therefore, the straightforward declara-
tions of the appellant that the machine was used up 
until Christmas clearly were knowingly and inten-
tionally made, and the jury could reasonably so 
conclude. Appellant argues that it was a statement 
only of his belief, and there was no evidence that 
would show the falsity of his belief. This is a failure 
to appraise the evidence in the required light and 
also an argumentative assertion in the face of the 
direct statement of the appellant, "We used this 
machine up until December, I'm sure, right until 
Christmastime." 
Clearly, the testimony of the appellant was 
proved false. Clearly, the testimony was false. Mr. 
John Van Ausdal, an employee of the Salt Lake 
County Roads and Bridges Division, testified that 
he had been the operator of the bitpaver since it 
was first used in 1959. He was responsible for lts 
use. He had used the machine when it was owned 
by Bonneville Equipment Co. and had become an 
employee of the county when the machine was 
leased to the county. His testimony was clear and 
direct that the bitpaver had not been used subse-
quent to Thanksgiving day in 1963, because of brake 
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damage and was not used again until April or May 
of 1964. 
Mr. Stanley Thayne testified that he was the 
"seal coat foreman" and was directly familiar with 
the use of the bitpaver. He testified that the machine 
was last used around the 15th or 20th of November, 
1963, and brought into the Salt Lake County Road 
Shops before Thanksgiving and not subsequently 
used until May of 1966. Thus, two witnesses have 
specifically testified to the falsity of the appellant's 
statements, under oath, to Judge Jones. This is, itself, 
sufficient to sustain the conviction. The appellant, 
by his own testimony, indicated that he knew the 
ti~e the machine was used. Further, his statement 
was much more than mere opinion or belief. It was 
a statement of fact, calculated to justify his mis-
conduct. 
In addition, Exhibit P-21, which was a record 
prepared daily by Mr. Joe Riccardi of the use of the 
bitpaver to spread chips, showed no chips were 
spread after November 15, 1963. The appellant 
assails the admission of the record because it was 
based on other information supplied by employees 
of the county to Mr. Riccardi. Appellant contends 
that the slips or documents on which the record 
was based must be produced under the theory of 
summary of voluminous records doctrine. Appellant 
misconstrues the law. The instant record was one 
kept in the regular course of business in the daily 
operations of the county. As such, it was admissible 
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in its own right. Thus, in 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, § 
1051, it is noted: 
"It has become the rule in a great majority of 
the states to admit entries in books made in the ord-
inary course of business at or near the time of the 
transaction to which they relate, where properly au-
thenticated according to the requirements of the par-
ticular jurisdiction." 
The fact that the record may be based on otk~r 
documents or information supplied is of no conse-
quence, if the record, itself, is not prepared for the 
litigation and is kept as part of the regular course 
of business of the party or entity. Thus, in 20 Am. 
Jur., Evidence§ 1061, it is stated: 
"Within the contemplation of the shopbook rule, 
the construction or form of the documents and the 
material used are not matters of importance if they 
are capable of perpetuating a record of events, and 
the charges thereon are fairly and honestly made in 
the regular course of business and as a part of the 
party's system of keeping his accounts, at or about 
the time of the transaction noted." 
In 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, § 1062, it is observed: 
"Entries in books, in order to be admissible, 
ordinarily must have been made in the regular course 
of business and as a part of the party's system of 
keeping his accounts. The fact that the entries are 
made by clerks in the regular routine of their em-
ployment and under the natural impulse of employees 
to perform their duties accurately is the safeguard 
of the accuracy of them. Indeed, under the systems 
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of bookkeeping in modern business houses, the me-
chanical precision with which numerous employees 
record various transactions, together with the absence 
of any personal motive to misrepresent the facts of 
the transactions, makes the modern book of accounts 
a very high form of evidence in respect of transactions 
that are the proper subject matter for a book of ac-
counts." 
It is recognized by the courts that many entries 
of records are based on intermediate slips and ac-
counts, but this does not preclude the admissibility 
of the evidence. In 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, § 1066, 
it is acknowledged: 
"Under the modern methods of conducting bus-
iness, the information relative to the transactions 
constituting the book accounts often must pass 
through various hands before being permanently re-
corded and some system of providing temporary 
memoranda preparatory to the permanent records is 
necessary in order to insure accuracy. It would be 
impracticable to preserve for any great length of time 
the tags, slips, or other tokens constituting such orig-
inal memoranda and impossible, in view of the ever-
changing army of employees, to obtain the testimony 
of the person who made the temporary memoranda 
or conducted the transaction. Hence, following the 
rule of necessity which originated the admissibility 
of books of account in evidence, the courts do not re-
gard such temporary memoranda as the original en-
tries, but look to the permanent records as such orig-
inal entries, where properly verified." 
The rule relating to the introduction of a sum-
mary of bulky documents too numerous to be prop-
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erly handled in court is wholly unrelated to the rule 
dealing with business records, but relates to a sit-
uation where the documents themselves are the sub-
ject to be considered and a summary is made of 
their content. See 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, § 449, and 
more particularly, pp. 364 to 399, where it is clear 
that the voluminous documents rule is one relating 
to the best evidence rule as evidentiary proposition 
of no significance concerning Exhibit 21. This prin-
ciple should be compared against the rule of busi-
ness entries to which Exhibit 21 applies. 
McCormick, Evidence, p. 600, notes as to the 
type of evidence admitted here: 
"Under this principle, the cash-book, and the 
day-book or journal, recording the transactions in 
chronological order and made up either from original 
entries or from entries taken from temporary slips 
or memoranda, would be admissible as the first per-
manent record. Upon the same basis, a ledger or other 
similar book, wherein the items of debit and credit 
are arranged under the names of the parties concern-
ed, when made up day by day from memory or direct-
ly from the original slips or memoranda, would also 
be admissible. And where the ledger is made, not 
from memory or from the original slips, but from the 
journal, day-book and cash-book which are, in turn, 
based on the original slips, but is regularly, prompt-
ly, and systematically kept and is used and relied on 
in the operation of the business, it would seem that 
there could still be no sound reason against the ledg-
er's admissibility. It is far more convenient for use 
in evidence than the slips or the journal, when the 
purpose is to reveal the whole state of an account. 
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See Model Evidence Act (1927); Uniform Business 
Records as Evidence Act §§ 1, 2 (McCormick, supra, 
p. 607). See also, Joseph v. W. H. Groves Lauer-Day 
Saints Hospiial, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P.2d 330 (1957); 
Northcrest Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 122 Utah 
268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952); Polasky and Paulson, Busi-
ness Entries, 4 Utah L. Rev. 327 (1955). Consequent-
ly, the appellant's contention that Exhibit 21 is un-
available to support the conviction is wholly un-
meritorious. 
Finally, the evidence as to the servicing of the 
machine and purchases of gasoline and asphalt 
show the bitpaver was not used, as the appellant 
testified. Also, the weather reports belie the claim 
of use after November 15, 1963. Under the circum-
stances, the evidence was more than sufficient to 
support the jury's determination. 
C. Taking the Bitpaver to the Shops in January. 
Appellant contends that the evidence was in-
sufficient to show perjury, as respects the appel-
lant's testimony as to when the bitpaver was taken 
back to the county shops. Again, the appellant, in 
his brief, fails to appraise the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict, but rather, 
makes his argument from the opposite position and 
argumentatively contends for every inference in 
the evidence in his own favor. 
The appellant appeared before Judge Jones 
and stated that the bitpaver remained in the Chester-
field area of Salt Lake County and was not moved 
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back to the Salt Lake County Road Shops until some-
time in January, 1964. It should be remembered thf'.t 
the lease in question was for five months duration 
-which would have terminated sometime in Jan-
uary, although the lease did say it was to continue 
until February 22, 1964. The appellant obviously 
could not explain why, if the bitpaver had not been 
used since November 15, 1963, the lease was not 
cancelled, or why the lease payment was made in 
December, when the bitpaver was not used and 
where the contract was cancellable. By telling Judge 
Jones that the machine had been in Chesterfield 
obviously would tend to support a contention that 
the machine was intended to be used in December 
and January if possible. This statement would be a 
justification, although a feeble one, for not cancel-
ing the lease and saving the county money for Jan-
uary and December. The January money, aJthough 
prepaid, could have been recovered. If, as was 
suspected, the lease arrangement was one whereby 
lvfidvale Motors, Inc. would get additional money 
and the apnellant would get a kickback or free use 
of a vehide during his campaigns, the contentioD 
that the machine was not brought back to the shops 
until January would support an argument of legiti-
mate use or inadvertence. However, since the ma-
chine was returned to the shops in November, the 
appellant, as head of the department, should have 
acted to cancel the lease, unless there was some 
hidden reason for not doing so which was what 
Judge Jones was making inquiry as to. Thus, the 
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question was very material to the inquiry. The ap-
pellant made a flat assertion that he knew the m::i.-
chine was in Chesterfield until sometime in January. 
Thus, there is ample evidence to support the jury's 
conclusion that the appellant knowlingly and wil-
fully intended to mislead Judge Jones in order to 
cover up his own inaction. 
The evidence is very specific in showing the 
date the machine was returned to the shops. Mr. 
Van Ausdal, the operator, specifically testified that 
the machine was taken to the shops at the time the 
brake coupling broke (Tr. 211). Mr. Stanley Thayne 
testified: 
"Q Do you recall when it was brought into 
the shop, was it before or after Thanksgiving 
of 1963? 
A I believe it was before." 
He further indicated that it was only about ten 
days after the breakdown that it was returned (Tr. 
221). Finally, he indicated that there was no snovr 
when the bitpaver was returned and there was five 
inches of snow received on the 15th of November. 
Consequently, the evidence was strong that the 
machine did not remain in the Chesterfield area 
until sometime in January. Further, the chip reports 
tend to corroborate the testimony of both witnesses. 
Thus, there was ample evidence to warrant the jury 
returning a conviction, 41 Am. Jur., Perjury§ 67. The 
matter was clearly one for the jury. Fletcher v. State, 
20 Wyo. 284, 123 Pac. 80 (1912); Ayers v. State, 20 
Ariz. 189, 178 Pac. 782 (1918). As noted in the cited 
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cases, the question of intent, knowledge or willful-
ness in such cases, as well as materially, to some 
extent, is one of fact for the jury. 
D. Other Property Leased by the County. 
The final area where the respondent submits 
that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's 
determination of guilt is that portion of the indict-
ment charging that the appellant falsely testified as 
to other equipment that had been leased by the 
county. A reading of Exhibit P-2 makes it clear that 
Judge Jones was inquiring of ex-Commissioner 
Brady as to what other forms of equipment the De-
partment of Roads and Bridges leased in order to 
determine whether the bitpaver incident, wherein 
a piece of equipment was leased for two separate 
occasions and the total amount paid by the county 
was more than twice the cost to the lessor, was a 
single affair or whether it was one of a pattern. The 
appellant's answer was clear that the other leased 
items were of minimal importance, a garbage truck 
or a sweeper. The appe1l0.nt made no mention of 
the lea.sing of the Alles-Chalmers Crawler Tractor 
from Motor Lease, Inc. 
The reason for the appellant's non-disclosure 
is obvious. Motor Lease, Inc. is a corporation with 
which Ted Newsom, who was connected with the 
bitn:i.ver deal, was associated. Two leases covering 
the equipment were executed, both signed by 
Newsom and both leased for the Division of Roads 
and Bridges, which was appellant's department. 
The first lease (Exhibit P-18) was for a one month 
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period at $3,000.00. It was executed because a prn-
vious lease (Exhibit P-15) was not executed for reas-
ons which are apparent and will be discussed la.ter. 
The second lease (Exhibit P-19) was from June 15, 
1963, to June 14, 1965, and, thus, was still in effect 
whe the appellant testified before Judge Jones on 
May 7, 1965. The second lease was for $3,000.00 for 
the first six months and $1,880.00 for the remaining 
eighteen months. Thus, the total amount the county 
was required to pay under the lease was $51,840.00, 
when the lease ran for only two years. Mr. Thomas 
McKean, a sales engineer for Cate Equipment Com-
pany, testified that the tractor was sold to Motor 
Lease, Inc. for $43,851.00 on the 21st of May, 1963, d 
few days before a proposed lease (Exhibit P-15) be-
tween Motor Lease, Inc. and the county was to have 
commenced. Further, the first lease (Exhibit P-18) 
ran from the 15th day of May or before Motor Lease, 
Inc. even had purchased the equipment from Cate 
for resale to the county. 
Although Exhibits 18 and 19 were executed by 
Commissioner Marvin G. Jensen for the county, they 
were entered into on behalf of the Division of Roads 
and Bridges, of which the appellant was in charge 
(Tr. 263). Commissioner Jensen merely executed the 
leases because the purchasing department was 
under his iurisdicition. He testified that he would 
not interefere with the internal operations of Roads 
and Bridges (Tr. 264). Jensen testified that Roads and 
Bridges would draw up the specifications or the 
commissioner in charge would indicate the equip-
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ment he needed a_nd "make recommendations for 
the leasing of the equipment." (Tr. 264). 
Jensen said with reference to Exhibit 15, a pro-
posed lease, that he had a conversation with the ap-
pellant. He testified: 
"A. Something Jike that Commissioner Brady 
asked me if I had signed this and I to]d him I hadn't 
and he stated the urgency of getting the piece of 
equipment, something to this effect, and he said, I 
told him "I wouldn"t sign it." He said, "if you don't 
sign it or else, he would bring it before the county 
commission." At that time I told him that if he want-
ed to bring it before the commission why it would 
be fine, if you want to taJk to me about this after the 
commission meeting I will be happy to point out 
some of the factors in the contract." 
He then said after the meeting that he pointed 
out a few facts to the appellant, mainly that the lease 
was for over $80,000. m Thereafter, the lease was 
dropped and the two leases, totalling $54,840.00 were 
executed. The importance of Exhibit 15 could hardly 
be said to inflame the jury, as appellant so theatrical-
ly suggests; rather, it was shown that the appellant 
was well aware of the circumstances leading up to 
the two leases he failed to disclose to Judge Jones, 
and that his motive may well have been to cover 
up the proposed lease in order to avoid the obvious 
inference that the bitpaver was not the only ques-
tionable transaction in which the appellant, New-
(1) It should be remembered that Motor Lease, Inc. was going to purchase 
the machine for $43,851.00. 
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som and Neuman C. Petty(2) were involved. Con-
sequently, it was most relevant evidence. 
Further, the two leases executed were in excess 
of the purchase price and undoubtedly could ha-1e 
reflected upon the appellant, thus providing the 
reason for the failure to disclose and for giving of 
the false testimony as to the leases entered into by 
the county. Further, since the appellant had told 
Jensen of the urgency of the need for the equip-
ment and there was the exchange between the ap-
pellant and Jensen, this, when coupled with the 
fact that the leases were for the appellant's depart-
ment, that he had knowledge of the impending 
transaction, that requests to lease were initia_ted 
from the deportment concerned with a recommen-
dation for leasing, and the one lease was still in 
effect when the appellant testified, shows that there 
is ample evidence on which the jury could have 
concluded that the appellant intentionally failed to 
disclose the existence of the other leases with the 
persons who had previously testified (a fact of which 
Brady was appraised). 
Since questions of intent in perjury cases are 
usually for the jury, this court could not conclude 
that the jury and trial court were amiss in this in-
stance. The California court in People Vo Morris, 138 
Cal.App.2d 317, 292 P.2d 15 (1956), in the face of 
comparable contentions, affirmed the conviction. In 
People v. Dixon, 99 Cal.App.2d 94, 221 P.2d 198 
(2) Brady was advised that Neuman C. Pettv had already testified before 
Judge Jones as had Ted Newsom (Exhibit P2, p. 2). 
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(1950), the court observed: 
"In every case perjury must be knowingly false, 
and in every case the defendant's actual state of mind 
cannot be directly proved. It is for the jury to say 
in every case of perjury whether the defendant be-
lieved the truth of his testimony when he gave it." 
When the inferences that may be drawn from 
the record are weighed in a light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict, the court must conclude that there 
is sufficient evidence to convict on the testimony 
of the appellant, as respects other itGms of equip-
ment leased by the Salt Lake County Roads and 
Bridges Division. 
In summary, the evidence is overwhelmingly 
in supoort of three of the four particulars of false 
testimony outlined in the indictment and the bill of 
particul&rs furnished by the district attorney. Since 
only one is sufficient to convict, it is obvious th;J_t 
taking the evidence most favorable to the responcl-
ent, it must be concluded that the evidence supports 
J1 ' I d' t 1:"1e iury s ver ic . 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURTS RULINGS ON THE ADMIS-
SION OF EVIDENCE PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR RE-
VERSAL. 
A. Testimony of Judge Jones. 
The appellant contends that during the testi-
mony of Judge Jones the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in not striking from Judg2 Jones' 
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answer as to what a particular exhibit was, the 
Judge's statement that it was an "amended com-
plaint." Thereafter, appellant goes on to make vari-
ous arguments in his brief without, in any way, en-
lightening the reader on what basis he contends 
error was made. 
The testimony of Judge Jones was obviously 
relevant. Judge Jones was the magistrate before 
whom the testimony of appellant was given. Ex-
hibit P-1 wc..s a copy of the John Doe complaint which 
was the jurisdictional basis of the inquiry before 
Judge Jones. It was completely relevant. It was th() 
on]v docume11t presented to the jury or read to th:c.: 
jury. It n~erely identified the nature of the inquiry 
,3nd_ :'::JfOVided the jury with essential information SO 
th~t they could understand the rea_son for the ap-
p2ll:1ni's +es+irriony before the Judge. At the time 
of its offer by the district attorney, the appellant's 
counsel objected to the receipt of the document and 
took the witness on voire dire. Previously, Judge 
Jones had identified the exhibit (Tr. 108)_ Counsel, 
apparently after voire dire, objected to the admis-
sion of the document, not on the basis of relevancy, 
materiality or other evidentiary basis, but upon one 
of the same theories he argued for suppression of 
Judges Jones' interrogation of Brady. Without reach-
ing that issue, the district attorney sought to lay 
further foundation for the admission of the exhibit. 
He then took the court file and asked the Judge to 
identify E:d1ibit P-2, attached thereto (Tr. 21), so that 
the continl1 ity of fodge fones' action could be de-
termin2d. Tl_--, e J ud::;;·e charc::.cterized the exhibit in the 
34 
file as an ''amended complaint" (Tr. 110). An exam-
ination of the record reveals that this is probably 
what it was in fact. The file document was a photo-
copy of the original of Exhibit P-1 a.nd Judge Jones 
identified the signatures and ma.rkings he made 
thereon. Exhibit P-1 was received. (3) Clearly, Exhibit 
P-1 was relevant; the "amended complciint" 'NC!.'' 
not shown to the jury nor identified a.s anything but 
a copy of Exhibit P-1. At the time, there was no ob-
jection offered to Exhibit P-1 on the basis of its being 
"inflamatory." The characterization by Judge Jones 
of the photocopy as an "amended complaint" 
would hardly, without more, have meant anything tu 
the jury. It rested within the sound discretion of th8 
court to determine whether the jury could under-
stand the matter. A more innocuous claim of errcr 
would be hard to imagine. 
Section 77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, re-
quires any error to be prejudicial and "affect the 
substantial rights" of an accused before reversal is 
in order. State v. Romeo, 42 Utah 46, 128 Pac. 530 
(1912). Obviously, this action of the trial court, if it 
was error at all, was, at the best, the most harmless 
error. 
B. Testimony of the Witness Nielsen. 
The appellant contends that the trial court cor:i-
mitted prejudicial error in admitting into evidence 
the testimony of Hubert H. Nielsen as to the prelim-
inary inquiries and negotiations he had with Mr. 
(3) The only objection raised was that of "no foundation." 
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Boyd Nerdin, the Superintendent of the County 
Road Shops, and with Mr. Ted Newsom before the 
lease between the county and Midvale Motors, Inc. 
was executed for the bitpaver. c4J 
Mr. Hubert H. Nielsen was the original owner 
of the bitpaver. He was the alter ego of Bonnevill0 
Equipment Inc. (Tr. 159). He testified that he ha.cl the 
bitpaver for sale in 1963. He testified that he nego-
tiated with Mr. Boyd Nerdin, Superintendent of Salt 
Lake County Roads and Bridges, for the machine. 
The district attorney asked if he had a conversation 
with Nerdin concerning the machine and the court 
ruled the conversation to be "res gestae" and part 
of a "business transaction." Nielsen testified there-
after that he went into "some detail on the bitpaver 
with the idea of trying to interest Salt Lake Count}r 
Roads and Bridges in" the machine (Tr. 162). The 
following then occurred (Tr. 162): 
"O Other than the details of the equipment 
itself, was there anything said about the pur-
chase of it or attempt to purchase it? 
A Well, natura.lly, when you are trying to sell 
something you are talking purchase, buy and 
sell. 
MR. GUSTIN: I move that be stricken. It is a 
conclusion and doesn't purport to be a part of 
conversation. 
(4) The appellant in his brief implies the conversations took place after 
the execution of the lease; this is not true and hence renders in-
appropriate most of the challenges made in appellant's argument on 
the issue. 
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THE COURT: The objection is overruled. I 
believe it is an insult to the jury to quibble into 
this matter. Ask your next question." 
Thus, the only evidence was that an effort wa.s 
made by Mr. Nielsen to sell the :i:nachine to Salt Lake 
County. Contrary to the bold statement in appel-
lant's brieL p. 24, there were negotiations prelim-
inary to a proposed sci.le to Salt Lake County. The 
operciJi,-.,~e fact d the conversation that was had with 
Nerdin and the subject matter discussed, as well as 
the nature of the negotiations, were clearly not hea:--
say. They were preliminary facts to show how the 
bitpaver transaction occurred and why the appel-
lant perjured himself before Judge Jones. It is well 
settled that the hearsay rule is not applicable to 
declarations as operative facts. Judge Wahlquist d 
cu_~rse, S3-W this and validly overruled the objec-
tion. McCormick, Evidence, pp. 463-464 (l 954). 
In State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 231 N.Vv7. 
225 (1930), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
conversations with third persons relaLng to negc 
tiations for bribes and the whole transaction \flras ad-
missible as operative facts. The Pennsylvania court 
reached a similar conclusion in a prosecution fo~ 
corrnpt solicitation of a juror, Commonwealth v, 
Wiswesser, 134 Pa. Super. 488, 3 A.2d 983 (1939). 
Conversations in furtherence of expected trade ari::> 
recognized as admissible, Glassma:J. ,,. Barron, 2Tl 
Mass. 376, 178 N.E. 628 (1931). See also Wigmoro, 
Evidence, 3rd Ed.,§§ 1770, 1772, 1777. 
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In Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 
(1953), this court recognized the rule and allowed 
conversations at the time of a transaction, noting: 
"They are the verbal acts which go to make up 
the very transaction which is under scrutiny to de-
termine its legal effect. The fact that promises and 
representations were made is material to the issues of 
this action; they do not evidence 'the truth of the 
matter * * * asserted therein * * * ,' at least in the 
sense that Wigmore uses that phrase." 
See also Wade J., concurring in John C. Cutler 
Ass'n v. De Jay Stores, 3 Utah2d 107, 279 P.2d 700 
(1955): 
"However, if the fact of whether or not the state-
ment was made is a material issue in the case, or 
the statement accompanies an ambiguous or equi-
vocal act serving to complete and give it definite 
legal significance it is a verbal act which constitutes 
a material fact in the case or if the fact that such 
statement was made is a circumstance which tends 
to prove a material issue in the case such a state-
ment is not being used as testimonial evidence of 
the statement made on the credit of the person mak 
ing the statement who is not a witness and therefore 
is not hearsay evidence. Where the 'question is not 
whether the statements are true, but whether they 
were made' such statements are not excluded by the 
rule against hearsay." 
Obviously, the objection was properly over-
ruled. The fact that the court characterized counsel's 
objection as quibbling was of not compelling con-
sequence. The objection to the evidence had been 
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previously overruled, and it appeared that the 
court was proper in reminding counsel of the need 
to avoid unnecessary interruption and argument. 
No prejudice can be assigned on this point. 
The next portion of the testimony challenged 
it as to whether the appellant's na_me came up in 
the conversation. The following occurred (Tr. 163): 
"Q Did Commissioner Brady's name come up 
in your conversation? 
MR. GUSTIN: Now, if the Court please,-. 
A. (Interposing) Yes. 
Q I will ask you, was that with reference to 
the purchase of this machine? 
A Yes. 
Q I will ask you to relate the conversation as 
accurately as you can recall it? 
A Well, I could-. 
MR. GUSTIN: If the Court please, that couldn't 
have any probative and binding effect on th , 
Defendant. We object to it as being hearsay. 
THE COURT: The jury is instructed as follows: 
the hearsay principle in law basically is this: 
A says to B something that he saw or heard, 
and then B comes c_long and recites it as .in-
formation that A has. This is distinguished from 
-for instance, if I go into a store and make a 
business transaction, whether it is completed 
or not completed, this is a different thing. A 
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business transaction is a thing just like an ob-
ject is a thing, and a business transaction may 
be testified to regardless of whether someone 
else happens to or happens not to recite in-
formation. You may continue. 
Q. Your answer to the question then? 
A. Well, I asked Mr. Nerden if he would talk 
to Mr. Brady about getting some interest in 
the machine, to purchase it. 
Q. Was there anything further, any further 
conversation at that time? 
A. Well, no sir. He just said that he would do 
so. He would contact Mr. Brady and let me 
know." 
Thus, the same rule is applicable in determin-
ing the admissibility of the evidence. Obviously, 
the conversation went to negotiations. The record 
shows that eventually appellant, Nielsen and New-
som went to Indiana to observe a bitpaver. The 
things that caused appellant to take the trip, the pre-
liminary negotiations, were operative facts tendinq 
to explain the subsequent event. 
As to the third area of challenge to the testimony 
of Nielsen and the rulings thereon, the following 
occurred: 
Q. Subsequent to that conversation, did you 
have further conversation with anyone from 
Salt Lake County with reference to this machine 
or the purchase of this machine? 
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MR. GUSTIN: If it please the Court no founda-
tion, leading and suggestive. 
THE COURT: Answer the question. Did you 
have a further conversation, answer yer, or no, 
with someone from Salt Lake County, if you can. 
A. Yes, I talked with Mr. Nerden. 
THE COURT: Just a minute. Lay a foundation. 
Q. Can you tell us when and where that oc-
curred? 
A. Just a few days later, I would say maybe 
four or five days. 
Q. And, where did that conversation take 
place? 
A. Well, I met Mr. Nerden on the way home 
up on the east bench. 
Q. Was anyone else present? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Will you tell us what was said with ref-
erence to the purchase of the machine at that 
time? 
A. Mr. Nerden said that he had talked with Mr. 
Brady about it, but he said that he says there 
is another man that is closer to Mr. Brady than 
anybody, whom I suggest that you talk to." 
Note, that no objection to this testimony was 
made on the grounds of hearsay, so that if such wo.s 
the nature of the testimony, the failure to properly 
i 
I 
I 
I 
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object to it on the appropriate grounds precluded 
any claim of error. Hearsay evidence not properly 
objected to may be validly received by the jury and 
considered by it. Child v. Child, 8 Utah2d 261, 332 
P.2d 981 (1958); White v. Newman, 10 Utah2d 62, 348 
P.2d 343 (1960); 79 A.L.R.2d 890 et seq. Further, it 
is submitted that the evidence was admissible for 
two reasons: (1) to show the effect on the hearer, and 
(2) part of the business transaction and, hence, an 
operative fact. 
There is no question that evidence that might 
otherwise be characterized as hearsay may be re-
ceived into evidence to show the effect of the evi-
dence on the hearer. McCormick, Evidence, p. 464 
(1954). Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., § 1789 notes: 
"Wherever an utterance is offered to evidence 
the state of mind which ensued in another person in 
consequence of the utterance, it is obvious that no 
assertive or testimonial use is sought to be made of 
it, and the utterance is therefore admissible, so far 
as the Hearsay rule is concerned." 
The evidence was admissible to show the in-
formation on which Nielsen acted. Emick Motors 
Corp v. General Motors Corp., 181 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 
1950). As a result of the conversation, the record is 
undisputed that Nielsen got hold of Newsom, had 
conversations with him and that the appellant be-
came interested in the bitpaver. Consequently, the 
evidence was directly admissible and not objec-
tionable. 
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Also, it is submitted that the evidence was ad-
missible to show the setting of subsequent trans-
actions and, thus, a part of the res gestae of the busi-
ness transaction. 
Finally, a third part of Nielsen's testimony is 
challenged by appellant. The district attorney asked 
what else had been said, without objection, and re-
ceived the following answer (Tr. 164): 
"A. Well, he said, "I suggest that you talk to 
him, Ted Newsom appeared in court, he said, "I 
think he might be able to help you on this type of 
thing." He is Mr. Brady's gubernatorial campaign 
manager and handled his affairs on anything that 
might reflect upon him." 
Counsel for appellant made a motion to strike 
on various grounds only tv10 of which are relevar:~ 
to this appeal. First, it is contended that the testi-
mony was inflamatory; and, second, it is hearsay. 
The court denied the motion to strike. Respondent 
submits that the evidence was properly received. 
The appellant, having failed to make timely ob-
jection, cannot now complain if the evidence was 
hearsay. A motion to strike comes too bte. Abbott, 
Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., § 352. Further, the 
evidence was obviously not hearsay, because it wa.s 
offered for the effect on the witness, and as noted 
above, is not objectionable as hearsay on such a 
basis. Nielsen testified almost immediately thc.t, 
thereafter, he made further contact with Ted New-
som in an effort to sell the bitpaver to Salt Lake 
43 
County (Tr. 165). Obviously, the evidence was ad-
missible. 
The contention that it was inflamatory and 
aimed at prejudicing the jury cannot be accepted. 
The evidence was relevant to show Nielsen's ac-
tions and the reason in Nielsen's mind for his deal-
ings with Newsom. It also ties Newsom in with the 
subsequent trip to Indiana. The evidence was direct-
ly relevant. The question of whether the evidence 
was inflamatory is a balancing question, McCor-
mick, Evidence, p. 319 (1954-). The trial judge could 
determine better than anyone the balance to be 
struck. McCormick notes the problem and observes 
(p. 320): 
"This balancing of intangibles-probative values 
against probative dangers-is so much a matter where 
wise judges in particular situations may differ that 
a lee-way of discretion is generally recognized." 
The courts have generally said that under such 
circumstances, the matter rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial judge. Duvall v. Birden. 124 
Conn. 43, 198 Atl. 255 (1938); Thompson v. American 
Steel & Wire Co., 317 Pa. 7, 175 Atl. 541 (1934); 31A 
C.J.S. Evidence, §§ 437, 438. The evidence can hardly 
be said to be so inflamatory as would evoke the 
unnessary ire of the jury. Indeed, in the context of 
the case as whole, it appears to have been one small 
item of little significance. A jury certainly has some 
degree of rationalitv and the evidence received, 
othervrise relevant and admissible, cannot be said 
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to be of such a nature as would upset the rationality 
of the jury. 
With reference to appellant's assertions of th.~ 
bad faith of the district attorney, little need be said, 
except to note that there was a sound evidentiary 
predicate for his actions. The intimidatory nature of 
the appellant's ossertions of "warnings" in an effort 
to extort the prosecutor from his sworn duty are 
most deplorable. They merely underline a conclu-
sion that should be obvious from the record, that in 
every lawsuit there are two sides and someon8 
usually loses. Appellant, having lost, may, indeed, 
feel bitter, but that is no reason to challenge the 
integrity of the winning counsel, whose only vice 
was a more sound knowledge of the rules of evi-
dence and deft trial ability. 
There is no basis for reversal as to Mr. Nielsen's 
testimony. 
C. Dur!ng the Testimony of Mr. Russell. 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in 
ruling on the testimony of Mr. Russell as to the ques-
tion of who was the majority stockholder of Midvale 
Motors, Inc. The question was relevant since there 
had been testimony previously given that Ted New-
som had represented that he was the majority stock-
holder of J'v1idvale Motors, Inc., the company thct 
bought the bitpaver from Nielsen and leased it to 
the county at an exorbitant rate. The check given 
Nielsen by Newsom was signed by Newsom as 
President of Midvale Motors, Inc. (Tr. 176). The ques-
45 
tion put to Mr. Russell was as to the truth of New-
som' s assertion and Russell negatived the conten-
tion and indicated that Neuman C. Petty was major-
i'l-y stockholder and president of Midvale Motors, 
Inc. This tended to show that Newsom had falsely 
represented to make the purchase and then lease 
to the county, through the appellant, at an uncon-
scionable price. Therefore, it indicated a scheme 
that was not completely proper and, again, provided 
a motive for the appellant's untruthful testimony be-
fore Judge Jones. 
The test of relevancy is whether it is probative 
and all that is required is "the relation between the 
propositions for which the evidence is offered and 
the issues in the case," McCormick, Evidence, p. 315 
(1954). It need only "tend to establish the inference 
for which it is offered." McCormick, op. cit. p. 317; 
Redomsky v. United States, 180 F.2d 781, ?i83 (9t.i.i 
Cir. 1950). Applying the above test to the sifoation 
faced by the trial judge, it is clear that the evidence 
was relevant. The court's comment that the jury 
would judge the relevancy was merely another way 
of advising counsel that the evidence met the test 
of admissibility and the jury would determine its 
significance. It should be remembered that trial 
judges are under the pressure of the case and the 
articulation of the basis of their ruling may be less 
than perfect. However, since the evidence was 
otherwise admissible, the appellant is in no position 
to complain. 
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In addition, it can hardly be said that such a rul-
ing would be more than harmless error. 
D. Testimony of the Witness Jensen. 
Appellant, as his final challenge to the court's 
handling of the evidence, contends impropriety 
with reference to the testimony of Commissioner 
Jensen. The basis of the appellant's challenge is 
predicated on an assumption that Exhibit 15 was 
only offered in "bad faith" and that it was without 
probative value. As noted before, infra p. ________ , the 
evidence had direct bearing on the motive of ap-
pellant in failing to disclose the lease of the Alles-
Chalmers tractor that was leased to the county. The 
refusal of appellant to truthfully reveal the lease, 
which was still in effect at the time of his testimony 
before Judge Jones, must have been predicated, in 
part, on the realization that this would lead to the 
disclosure of the proposed lease, Exhibit 15, which 
was sought by appellant, and was to be executed 
before the equipment was sold to Motor Lease, Inc, 
and after the county had the equipment, unless 
Exhibit 18<5) was a total fraud. 
Exhibit 15 was a lease that appellant strongly 
urged Jensen to adopt, and said he would take be-
fore the commission. Jensen told the appellant that 
the lease was for payments of over $80,000.00. The 
appellant then appeared surprised and called a_ Mr. 
Browning, his assistant. The proposed lease of ap-
(5) Exhibit 18 was a one-month lease for part of the month of May 
through part of June. The lease started before Motor Lease, Inc. 
owned the tractor. 
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proximately $80,000.00 would have been a fantastic 
waste of public money, since the machine was pur-
chased by Motor Lease, Inc. for about one-half of 
the lease rental. 
With such a situa_tion, it seems probable that the 
appellant would have failed to disclose the subse-
quent leases (which were open to question since 
they exceed the purchase price of the tractor). Thus, 
Exhibit 15 was a piece of evidence directly tending 
to substantiate the a_ppellant's motive for perjury. 
As to the bad faith contention, it is interesting to 
note (a) the trial judge found the evidence relevant, 
(b) the jury apparently was not offended by its rele-
vance to the claim of perjury, (c) there is a legitimate 
legal premise for its admission, and (d) the Attorney 
General finds a direct relationship between Exhibit 
15 and the position of respondent on appeal. The 
assertion of bad faith vanishes. See also infra p. --------· 
Appellant must live with his wrongdoings and 
urgent attempts to transfer the blame to the prose-
cution cannot sustain his position on appeal. 
E. Summary of Appellant's Claims of Eviden-
tiary Error. 
The appellant ha.s placed a summary of con-
tentions in his brief with reference to the alleged 
errors of the trial court in ruling on the admissibility. 
Respondent has cited its authorities and set forth 
its rebuttal argument in the portion of its brief where 
each contention of error is discussed. Consequently, 
there is little need to rehash the claims of hearsay, 
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bad faith or relevance. Appellant's arguments are 
not applicable to the facts of this case. 
However, respondent feels it important to rebut 
any contention made by the appellant that the trial 
judge abandoned his role in ruling on the evidence 
to the discretion of the jury. In actual fact, all the 
court did was leave to the jury the determination 
of what weight the jury should accord to otherwi3e 
relevant evidence. Although juries may not have 
the sophistication of counsel, they generally have 
the sophistication and maturity of the experience of 
life. Recent studies have shown the jury to have 
unusual wisdom and insight and to use reasonable 
judgment, Joines, Civil Justice and the Jury (1962). 
It is submitted that it is clear from the record 
that when the discretion of the trial judge is weighed 
against the whole case, there was no error, or if 
there was, it was so slight as to be harmless. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERS-
IBLE ERROR IN THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO 
THE JURY OR IN NOT GIVING THE REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS OF APPELLANT. 
The appellant contends that the trial court erred 
in giving instructions No. 2 and No. 15, in that they 
were erroneous, and that other instructions (Nos. 
14, 15, 16, and 6) contained defects. 
Instruction No. 2, set out in appellant's brief, 
p. 56, merely appraises the jury of the allegations 
in the indictment and instructed the jury on the 
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prosecution's theory of the case. The instruction was 
not given in the abstract, but was tailored to the 
evidence and issues that had been raised before 
the court. The instruction also highlighted for the 
jury the four areas wherein the prosecution alleged 
that the appellant had perjured himself. The court 
framed the instruction so that the procedural cir-
cumstances of the appellant appearing before Judge 
Jones were intelligible against the allegations in the 
indictment. This action of the trial judge was clearly 
what he was compelled to do, if he were to comply 
with cases previously decided by this court. In State 
v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153 (1946), this 
court criticized the trial court for not doing what the 
trial judge in this case did. The court observed: 
"We have repeatedly criticized the giving of ab-
stract statements of the law to the jury, and held 
that it is the duty of the court to apply the law to 
the facts supported by the evidence and to not in-
struct on any question which is not involved in the 
case under the evidence. (citing cases) We think 
that it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the 
court should apply the law to the facts as they ap-
pear from the evidence, and should instruct only on 
the law which has a bearing on facts, and in stating 
the necessary elements to constitute the crime 
charged it should submit to the jury the facts in-
volved in the case and not merely generalizations, 
and where possible should avoid the use of techni-
cal legal terms and cumbersome definitions thereof, 
by using terms which will readily be understood by 
laymen. In that way, the jury will be given a much 
clearer understanding of its problems." 
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Thus, this court has heretofore expressed ils 
position in favor of tailoring the law to the facts in 
such a manner as would make the instruction mean-
ingful in the context of the case in which it is given. 
Indeed, the posture of the State's case was pin-
pointed in reference to the State's factual allegations. 
Appellant, it would seem, would have had the judge 
instruct on abstract rules of law. By properly tailo:::--
ing the instructions and pinpointing the essential 
contentions of the prosecution, he was helping the 
jury to see the particular issues they were required 
to determine. Appellant complains that in Instruc-
tion No. 2, the jury was advised that the failure of 
appellant to reveal the Alles-Chalmers tractor that 
was leased was the essence of the question of 
whether the appellant perjured himself in spea_king 
to the question of other leased equipment. This was 
the very contention of the prosecution and the only 
issue of evidence on the matter; consequently, it 
was perfectly proper for the court to pinpoint the 
issue against the facts. The court was not compelled 
to charge the jury in the exact language of the in-
dictment so long as the instruction otherwise reason-
ably informs the jury of the law applicable to the 
case. Indeed, in the Thompson case, supra, this 
court encouraged trial courts to refrain from using 
technical legal language. There is no error on this 
point. 
Appellant's second contention is that the court 
erred in giving Instruction No. 15. The respondent 
submits that there is absolutely no merit to this point. 
The instruction must be examined as whole to see 
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if it adequately explains the law to the jury. The first 
sentence of Instruction No. 15 advises the jury of 
the required standard of proof in witnesses and cor-
roborating circumstances. The second paragraph 
defines what is a corroborating circumstance. The 
third paragra_ph, which is the paragraph to which 
appellant objects, explains that corroborative cir-
cumstances can be circumstantial or direct and that 
the entire conduct as witness in his own behalf "be-
fore a city judge" and at other times may provide 
the corroboration. It is submitted that the instruction, 
when taken as a whole, is adequate and not prejudi-
cial. 
Appellant says that the district attorney took 
exception to Instruction No. 15, which is true; how-
ever, thereafter, the court amended the instruction 
by interlineation and confined the testimony portion 
of the instruction to the appellant's apeparance in 
the city court. This avoided a possible inference 
from his failure to take the stand in his own behalf. 
Therefore, no ground can be claimed by the appel-
lant from the district attorney's action. 
The appellant's claim that the instruction emas-
culates the so-called "quantitative rule," required, 
in some instances, in proof of perjury, is without 
merit. The instruction merely advises the jury of 
certain sources that may be considered in determin-
ing whether the required corroboration has been 
shown. 
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In 41 Am. Jur., Perjury, p. 38, it is observed: 
"The corroboration of a single witness for the 
prosecution in a perjury case may be by circumstant-
ial evidence." 
In addition, in 41 Am. Jur., Perjury, § 68, it is ob-
served in part: 
"As a general rule, evidence of conduct showing 
consciousness of guilt, such as flight, may serve as a 
requisite corroborative circumstance to a statement 
of an accusing witness warranting conviction under 
an indictment for perjury. Motive and design to com-
mit a crime, if proved, may also be considered a guilty 
circumstance and, consequently, may serve legally a.s 
corroborative evidence." 
See also Anno. 111 A.LR. 828. 
Thus, the court's instruction was not improper. 
Additionally, as noted before, the quantitative evi-
dence rule is of doubtful application in Utah, at 
least to the extent appellant urges. 
The appellant's contention that the instruction 
somehow would cause the jury to believe that th1-::: 
appellant was charged in the John Doe complaint 
with the crime set forth is a torturous assertion. At 
the time the instruction was given, the jury had 
heard all the vidence and knew of the documents. 
They knew that the appellant and others were 
called as witnesses subsequent to the issuance cf 
Exhibit P-1. They were, it is submitted, more likely 
to believe the truth as set forth in the evidence that 
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the appellant was, along with others, interrogated 
to see if he knew or took part in the wrongdoing 
alleged. There could, therefore, have been no preJu-
dice to appellant from Instruction No. 15. 
Appellant finally merely asserts that Instruction 
No. 14 is inconsistent with Instructions 15 and 16, but 
does not disclose the nature of the inconsistency. 
Instruction No. 14 merely defines direct and circum-
stantial evidence and in no way is inconsistent with 
Instructions 15 and 16. 
Further, the assertions with reference to Instruc-
tion No. 6 that it is unintelligible and incompre-
hensible is argumentative, and a reading of the in-
struction, in light of all the instructions given, 
supports a conclusion that it provides no basis for 
a claim of prejudicial error. 
This court has on numerous occasions specified 
that in determining a claim of insufficiency or er-
roneous instructions, that the instructions given must 
be viewed as a whole. State v. Hendricks, 123 Utah 
267, 258 P.2d 452 (1952); State v. Evans, 107 Utah 1, 
151P.2d196 (1944); State v. Coleman, 17 Utah2d 166, 
406 P.2d 308 (1965). When the instructions given in 
the instant case are viewed in accordance with the 
above rule, it is clear that they were adequate and 
provide no basis for reversal. 
Finally, appellant contends that the court should 
have given his requested instructions Nos. 2 and 3. 
Instruction No. 3 was merely a statement on the re-
quired evidence to prove perjury. However, the in-
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struction is apparently little different than Instruc-
tion No. 15, as given by the court. Only the language 
of Instruction No. 15 is challenged, not the sub-
stantive explanation of the law. 
It is well settled that a party has a right to have 
the jury instructed in the language of his proposed 
instructions, if the law is otherwise adequately 
stated. In People v. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 25 Pac. 
737 (1891), this court observed: 
"While the above instrution was not given in the 
language of the learned counsel presenting them, yet 
it embodies the substance of the request, and leaves 
the question to the jury as a circumstance for them 
to consider, and to say whether, under all the facts 
and circumstances shown, possession of stolen prop-
erty was evidence of guilt or not; and at the same 
time the court instructed the jury that possession 
alone is not sufficient evidence upon which to con-
vict. These instructions were given with reference 
to the proofs before them at the time, which the jury 
must have understood and applied with reference to 
such facts of possession as were shown; and, while 
the instruction was not as full and explicit as it 
might have been, yet it sufficiently covered the quest-
ion presented. 
* * * * 
Where the charge of the court, as a whole, cov-
ered the questions embraced in the request to charge, 
so as to fairly submit them to the jury, and leave the 
question for them to pass upon, it is not error to re-
fuse the request to charge, though technically good in 
law. In such cases the court is not bound to use the 
language of the counsel, but may use his own." 
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See also, Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., 
663. 
The same conclusion applies to the appellant's 
contention as to his requested Instruction No. 2. The 
material was adequately covered in Instructions 3 
a.nd 5, as given. 
It is submitted that when the instructions given 
are ta_ken as a whole and in light of the evidence 
and posture of the case, there was no prejudicial 
error warranting reversal. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY OVERRULED 
THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE 
TESTIMONY OF JUDGE JONES. 
The appellant argues on appeal that the testi-
mony of Judge Jones should have been suppressed. 
On appeal, two bases are urged for the contention. 
First, it is asserted that since the complaint signed 
by Delmar Larson did not expressly state that the 
name of the accused person was unknown, this pre-
vented the proceeding from being a proper one. It 
is submitted that this is a hypertechnical assertion. 
The use of the name John Doe was a sufficient 
means of alleging the lack of identity of the accused. 
No particular form is required to state lack of knowl-
edge, and the use of the term "John Doe" universal-
1 y is understood to have a meaning that the actual 
name is unknown. Even so, this would not be a. 
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basis for suppression. In 41 Am. Jur., Perjury, § 25, 
it is stated: 
"Generally, the fact that jurisdiction of a 
court which has general jurisdiction of an offense docs 
not properly attach to the particular case in which 
the perjury charged is alleged to have been committ-
ed, because the complaint in the case has not been 
sworn to, does not defeat the charge of perjury. More-
over, while perjury cannot be assigned on al-
leged false testimony given in the course of a trial, 
where the court has no jurisdiction of the offense 
charged or of the defendant, yet if the proceedings 
are merely erroneous or voidable, even if there are 
such irregularities or defects as will require a re-
versal of the cause on appeal, false testimony given 
in the course of such trial, if material, constitutes 
perjury. Hence, perjury may be assigned on the testi-
mony in a criminal trial before justices, nothwith-
standing the warrant on which the defendant in such 
trial was arrested was illegal, having been issued with-
out a written oath or information." 
The allegation of appellant, when accepted in a 
light most favorable to him, shows only a minor ir-
regularity at best. Consequently, this would be no 
basis for suppression. 
The second basisC6) upon which appellant con-
tends the testimony he gave before Judge Jones 
should be suppressed is on the theory that his testi-
mony was given as a deposition and, consequently, 
he should have been given an opportunity to ex-
amine the deposition and make what changes he 
(6) Appellant challenged the proceedings on several other grounds, but 
has abandoned those on appeal. 
57 
desired and then sign it. It is submitted that there 
is no merit to such a contention. 
Section 77-11-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, was 
the section under which Judge Jones was proceed-
ing when appellant appeared before him. That sec-
tion reads: 
"When a complaint is made before a magistrate 
charging a person with the commission of a crime or 
public offense, such magistrate must examine the 
complaint, under oath, as to his knowledge of the 
commission of the offense charged, and he may also 
examine any other persons and may take their depos-
itions." 
The section allows the magistrate to "examine 
any other persons and take their depositions." When 
the appellant appeared before Judge Jones, he was 
examined. He was administered an oath and swore 
to tell the truth. He was, thereafter, interrogated 
concerning the "John Doe" complaint pending be-
fore the magistrate. This was an examination and 
a judicial proceeding. The conjunctive allows the 
magistrate to have the testimony reduced to writing. 
The deposition is a distinct certification apart from 
the examination made under oath by the witness. 
Section 76-45-1(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides: 
"A person is guilty of perjury who 
(1) Swears or affirms that he will truly testify, 
declare, depose or certify, or that any testimony, 
declaration, deposition, certificate, affidavit or other 
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writing by him subscribed is true, in, or in connection 
with, any action or special proceeding, hearing, or 
inquiry ,or on any occasion in which an oath is re-
quired by law or is necessary for the prosecution or 
defense of a private right or for the ends of public 
justice or may lawfully be administered, and who in 
such action or proceeding or on such hearing, inquiry 
or other occasion willfully and knowinnly testifies. 
declares, deposes or certifies falsely or states in hi3 
testimony, declaration, deposition, affidavit or certif- i 
icate any matter to be true which he knows to b2 i 
false." 
Thus, a_ny false testimony given at any hearinc;r 
or inquiry, or in any deposition is perjury, assum-
ing the presence of other elements. Consequently, 
the magistrate's examination was a sufficient judicial 
proceeding to make the rendition of folse oral testi-
mony perjurious. In, Burdick, Law of Crime, Vol. I, 
§ 328, it is observed: 
"It is necessary at common law in order to con-
stitute perjury, that the false testimony be given in 
a judicial proceeding, but that term is a very broad 
one. It may be either in a court of law or of equity, 
but it need not be before any court; it may be be-
fore commissioners, in an answer in chancery; upon 
some collateral matter not directly connected with 
the issue of a cause on trial, or an affidavit to hold 
to bail; or when one offering himself as bail, swears 
his property to be greatGr than it is; or the crime 
may be committed in some court of justice having 
power to administer oath, or before some magistrate 
invested with similar autho:rity, in some proceeding 
relative to a civil suit or criminal prosecution. 
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It has also been held perjury in a judicial pro-
ceeding where one falsely takes a poor debtor's oath 
before a magistrate, or gives false testimony under 
oath before a grand jury, or where a juror testifies 
falsely when examined on his voir dire." 
Thus, this was a judicial proceeding within the 
perjury statute. The normal giving of a deposition 
in a civil matter may not be. In any event, the sub-
sequent transaction of the appellant's testimony 
imposed no greater requirement and the false oral 
testimony before the magistrate was enough to meet 
the statutory elements for perjury. See also Clark & 
Marshall, Crimes, 6th Ed., Wingersky, p. 916. 
Appellant argues that since Section 77-44-2, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, makes the rules of evi-
dence applicable in criminal cases that are applica-
ble in civil cases, a requirement of authentication is 
necessary. It is submitted that the procedure appel-
land arques for is not a_ rule of evidence, but one 
of procedure, and Section 77-44-2 Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, is inapplicable. 
Section 76-45-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
must be read in light of Section 76-45-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, and when so done, it is apparent 
that false ori'll testimony in a proceeding before a 
m'.1gistrate is sufficient. Further, lack of authentica-
tion is no defense, since Section 76-45-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, provides that an irregularity in ad-
ministering the oath is no defense. It is submitted 
tha_t this -vro-i_,~ld be a similar situation, a minor irreg-
ularity that would not remove the taint of false, 
sworn testimony orally given, 70 CJS, Perjury 22 C. 
60 
It is submitted that the trial court did not err in 
denying the motion to suppress. 
POINT V. 
THE INDICTMENT RETURNED BY THE SALT 
LAKE COUNTY GRAND JURY WAS SUFFICIENT. 
The appellant, as his final claim on appeal, con-
tends that the indictment returned by the Salt Lak:G 
County Grand Jury, charging him with perjury in 
the first degree, was defective and that the trial 
court should have granted his motion to quash. The 
essence of the appellant's contention is a claim thot 
it is essential to sustain an indictment for perjury 
that the form of an indictment contain an annotation 
either (1) that the testimony given was material or 
(2) that the materiality of the alleged testimony be 
spelled out in the indictment. It is submitted that 
there is no merit to the appellant's position. 
The first case in Utah considering the sufficien-
cy of an indictment for perjury was People v. Green-
well, 5 Utah 112 (1886). It is admitted that in the 
Greenwell case, the indictment expressly men-
tioned that the testimony given before a grand jury 
in Weber County, Territory of Utah, was material. 
However, a reading of that case shows that there 
is no precedent for an allegation that materiality 
must be set forth with particularity under present-
day pleading standards, since under the Criminal 
Practice Act of 1878 and Sections 164 and 158 there-
under, which was in effect at the time of the Green-
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well case, the statutes expressly made mandatory 
the recitation of materiality. 
In State v. Anderson. 35 Utah 496, 101 Pac. 385 
(1909), the appellant was charged with perjury. The 
sufficiency of the indictment was challenged upon 
the concept of duplicity. It is worth noting that in 
the Anderson case, the court noted that under Sec-
tion 46110, Compiled Laws of Utah 1907, only four 
elements were necessary to sustain a complaint, 
and the information in the Anderson case did not 
specifically mention materiality, although, admitted-
ly, the facts pleaded were sufficient to show materi-
ality. Neither the Anderson case nor the Greenwell 
case dealt with present requirements of pleading. 
Section 77-21-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets 
forth the general standards for informations and in-
dictments. This provision was enacted in 1935, Laws 
of Utah 1935, Chapter 118, Section 1, and was part 
of a general modernization of the State Code of 
Criminal Procedure, based upon the American Law 
Institute's Model Code, promulgated in 1930. The 
above section now provides: 
"(1) The information or indictment may charge, 
and is valid and sufficient if it charges the offense 
for which the defendant is being prosecuted in one or 
more of the following ways: 
(a) By using the name given to the offense by 
the common law or by a statute. 
(b) By stating so much of the definition of the 
offense, either in terms of the common law or 
of the statute defining the offense or in terms 
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of substantially the same meaning, as is suffic-
ient to give the court and the defendant notice 
of what offense is intended to be charged. 
(2) The information or indictment may refer 
to a section or subsection of any statute creating 
the offense charged therein, and in determining the 
validity or sufficiency of such information or indict-
ment regard shall be had to such reference." (Em-
phasis added.) 
Thus, an information or indictment is sufficient, if 
it charges the crime in any one of the ways set forth 
in Section 77-21-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Sub-
section l(a) of the above cited section provides that 
the offense is sufficient for judicial purposes, if the 
name given it by common law or the statutory ref-
erence is plead. The indictment in the instant case 
is sufficient for two reasons: (1) the statutory refer-
ence is contained in the indictment, and (2) the in-
dictment expressly refers to the crime of perjury in 
the first degree. 
In State v. Hill, 100 Utah 456, 116 P.2d 392 (1941), 
this court acknowledged that the purpose of the new 
form of pleading was clearly to get away from the 
technicalities of pleading that existed at common 
law. This position was reaffirmed in State v. Lan-
drum, 3 Utah2d 372, 284 P.2d 693 (1965), upholding a 
conviction of the crime of robbery, where the in-
formation merely charged that defendant robbed 
victim. Thus, there is a clear statutory evolution 
away from the technicalities of pleading that were 
required at the time of People v. Greenwell, supra. 
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It is submitted that the indictment in this case, hav-
ing met one of the statutory standards, is sufficient. 
In State v. Spencer, 101 Utah 274, 117 P.2d 455 
(1942), this court was charged with considering the 
sufficiency of a perjury information. The court 
noted, with reference to Section 77-21-8, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953: 
"Section 105-21-8 of Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 
1935, quoted supra, provides that an offense may be 
charged in an information in three ways: (a) By 
using the name given by the statute; (b) By stating 
enough of the terms of the statute defining the of-
fense as is sufficient to give the court and the defend-
ant notice as to which offense is intended to be 
charged; or (c) By citation of, or reference to, the 
section or subsection of the statute creating the of-
fense charged in the information." 
The court then went on to observe: 
"Conformance with either of these three perm-
issive ways of charging the offense would have ap-
prised the court and the defendant of what offense 
was intended to be charged so the plea could be 
entered, defense prepared and the penalty be known 
and opposed, if such steps become necessary." 
Thus, the Spencer case is direct precedent in this 
jurisdiction for the conclusion that since the indict-
ment in this case complied with the statutory stand-
ards of Section 77-21-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
that appellant's objection was unmeritorious, and 
the trial court properly denied the motion to quash. 
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Further, it should be noted that the indictment 
in the instant case met the recommended statutory 
form set forth in Section 77-21-47, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. Admittedly, these forms are exem-
plary. State v. Spencer, 101 Utah 274, 121 P.2d 912 
(1942). However, in this instance, by using a statutory 
form, the statutory criteria in Section 77-21-8, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, were fully complied with. 
In State v. Hutchinson, 4 Utah2d 404, 295 P.2d 
345 (1956), this court overruled the Spencer case on 
other grounds. However, in doing so, it did indicate 
that compliance with the statutory form of pleading 
recommended in Section 77-21-47, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, was sufficient. This court said: 
"Without determining the debatable question as 
to whether this language was dictum or not, logic 
would dictate that without such language the con-
clusion is almost inescapable that one offense was 
included in the other and an accusation of perjury, 
without specifying the degree, would have been suf· 
ficient, since applicable statutes seem to say so and 
actually authorize perjury in the following form: 
'A. B. committed perjury by testifying as follows:." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The respondent admits that some cases have 
definitely advocated a proposition of expressly in-
dicating the materiality of the testimony in the in-
dictment or information. However, there is a very 
definite split of authority, which seems to depend 
upon the particular statutory or procedural rule in 
effect in the jurisdiction, 41 Am. Jur., Perjury, § 44. 
See also 70 C.J.S., Perjury,§ 44. 
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Most recently, in State v. Burch, 413 P.2d 805 
(Utah 1966), an appellant from a burglary conviction, 
challenged the sufficiency of the information. This 
court rejected the contention, finding the informa-
tion sufficient and stated: 
"Defendant says the information was insuffic-
ient to support the conviction. We think there is no 
merit in this contention, since it contained the name 
of the offense and the statute under which it was 
drawn." 
The court cited State v. Courtney, 10 Utah2d 200, 350 
P.2d 619 (1960), in support of its conclusion. A similar 
result was reached in State v. Dodge, 415 Pac. 212 
(Utah 1966). 
Other states have apparently recognized that 
there is no necessity for an allegation of the mate-
riality of the perjury under procedures of pleading 
comparable to those in Utah. 
In State v. Hawley, 186 N.C. 432 119 SE 88 (1923), 
the North Carolina Supreme Court was charged 
with considering the effect of the short form of in-
dictment or information on the requisite of pleading 
the materiality of the alleged perjured testimony. 
The court concluded that although the failure would 
have been fatal under previous statutes, that the en-
actment of the new provision dispensed with the 
necessity of an allegation as to the materiality of 
the perjured testimony. 
States immediately surrounding Utah, having 
comparable statutory provisions and a similar ident-
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ity of interest, have rejected the contention now 
urged by the appellant. 
In State v. Chee, 74 Ariz. 402, 250 P.2d 985 (1952), 
the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that under the new 
Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect in Arizona, an 
indictment which charged the accused with falsely 
answering a question as a witness before a grand 
jury in a manner very comparable to that charged 
in the instant case, was a sufficient allegation, and 
the absence of an allegation as to materiality would 
not affect the sufficiency of the indictment. 
In People v. Swanson. 109 Col. 371, 125 P.2d 
637 (1942), the Colorado Supreme Court noted that 
the indictment involved followed the identical 
forms prescribed by statute, and found the reference 
to materiality unnecessary. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the absence of 
an allegation of materiality is not such a sufficient 
defect as would warrant a conclusion that the indict-
ment in this case was fatally defective. The cases 
cited in appellant's brief in support of his conten-
tion either involve cases where the common law 
form of pleading or a derivative thereof is the 
standard procedural code of pleading, or involve 
cases decided well before the promulgation of the 
American Law Institute' s Model Code of Criminal 
Procedure in 1930, upon which the Utah procedure 
is based. 
This court, in State v. Hill, supra, took an ident-
ically inopposite conclusion as to the constitutional-
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ity of the procedural form of a pleading than tha.t 
taken in State v. Webber. 78 Vt. 463, 62 Atl. 1018 
(1906), upon which appellant relies. 
The indictment in the instant case clearly al-
leges that the appellant testified falsely before the 
Honorable Maurice D. Jones, judge of the City Court 
of Salt Lake City, after having been duly sworn, and 
testified "to the following material facts." (R.l). 
Generally, as noted in 41 Am. Jur., Perjury,§ 44, 
an indictment is sufficient "by showing an action at 
issue in a court of competent jurisdiction, the testi-
mony given, coupled with the averment that it was 
material to the issue." This was the action taken in 
the indictment in the instant case and is, therefore, 
generally sufficient. 80 A.LR. § 1443. 
It is submitted that there is no merit to the ap-
pellant's contention. He was adequately apprised, 
both at the time he appeared before Judge Jones 
and subsequent to the indictment, of the allegations 
against him. Appellant's urgings at this appeal 
would ask this court to turn the clock back on the 
modernization of criminal justice in the area of 
pleading. This court has refused to do so on num-
erous occasions. State v. Robbins, 102 Utah 119, 127 
P.2d 1042; State v. Avery, 102 Utah 33, 125 P.2d 803; 
State v. Landrum, supra; State v. Hill. supra; State v. 
Courtney, supra; State v. Burch. supra; and State v. 
Dodge, supra. Obviously, therefore, the appellant 
cannot contend that the indictment was insufficient 
upon which to sustain the prosecution. 
68 
The appellant's contention on the necessity of 
spelling out the matter of inquiry before the grand 
jury is also, for the above reasons, without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has challenged his conviction 
on several grounds, the primary of which is the in-
sufficiency of the evidence. When the evidence is 
viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
it is obvious that it is sufficient to sustain appellant's 
conviction. Appellant has challenged the good faith 
of the trial judge, the district attorney, and the very 
proceedings before which he falsely gave testi-
mony. It is submitted that there is no benefit to the 
appellant's attempts to place the guilt upon every-
one but himself. At the time of trial, he offered no 
explanation for his conduct, and the evidence suf-
ficiently sustained the jury's verdict. Allegations 
that prejudicial error was committed in the evidence 
and instructions are not sustained, when subjected 
to scrutiny. Appellant's contention that the evidence 
of his perjury should have been suppressed is based 
upon a hypertechnical argument and not sustained 
by analysis or authority. Finally, the allegation as 
to the insufficiency of the indictment melts in the 
presence of close analysis, and there is no merit 
to this position. 
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When the full nature of the proceedings are 
ezamined against the allegations which appellant 
now claims require reversal, it is apparent that there 
is no merit to his position on appeal. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
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